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People v. Olivas: The Concept of "Personal
Liberty" as a Fundamental Interest in
Equal Protection Analysis
By ROBERT V. VALLANDIGHAM, JR.*
Introduction
Under the leadership of Chief Justice Donald R. Wright, the California
Supreme Court consistently confronted and resolved many difficult and
often controversial constitutional issues during the decade of the 1970's. In
a number of instances,' the decisions rendered by the Wright court were
necessitated by the action and, in some cases, the inaction of the legislative
and executive branches of the California state government. As a result, the
court was often criticised by those in society and high office who perceive
the judiciary as being subservient to co-ordinate branches of government.
Notwithstanding such criticism of its assertive stance, the Wright court
compiled an impressive record in resolving such formidable constitutional
problems as the death penalty, 2 equal educational opportunity in a school
financing system based upon local property taxes, 3 preferential minority
admission programs at state-operated educational institutions, 4 and the permissible scope of full body searches when incident to arrests for minor
5
offenses.
* B.A., 1972, University of Southern California; J.D., 1975, University of Southern
California Law Center; member, California bar. Law clerk to Chief Justice Wright from June
1975 to January 1977.
1. See notes 2-5 infra.
2. People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 493 P.2d 880, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152 (1972) (death
penalty held invalid under cruel and unusual punishment clause of California Constitution).
3, Serrano v. Priest, 18 Cal. 3d 728, 557 P.2d 929, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1976) (school
financing system held unconstitutional); Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal.3d 584,487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal.
Rptr. 601 (1971).
4. Bakke v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 18 Cal. 3d 34,553 P.2d 1152, 132 Cal. Rptr. 680
(1976), cert. granted,429 U.S. 1090 (1977) (No. 76-811) (medical school admission program for

minorities held unconstitutional in absence of previous intentional discrimination against
minorities).
5. People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d 528, 531 P.2d 1099, 119 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1975)

(limitation on scope of search incident to arrest for minor offenses established under California
[757]
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That the California Supreme Court chose to review and resolve such
difficult and controversial issues is largely attributable to the influence of
Chief Justice Wright and his view of the judiciary's role in our tripartite
system of government. In contrast to some members of the judiciary who
have exhibited reticence to exercise the full extent of their power to review
legislative enactments or executive actions,6 Chief Justice Wright demonstrated a firm belief that in order to discharge its constitutional responsibilities, the judiciary must act when necessary both to curb the excesses of
the legislature and the executive and to rectify unjust situations that these
branches of government either refuse or are unable to remedy. The Chief
Justice expressed this judicial philosophy, which was implicit in his many
opinions, in an address he delivered shortly after the California Supreme
Court rendered its landmark death penalty decision in People v. Anderson :7
The Constitution. . . is an enduring but evolving statement of
general values designed to limit governmental action and protect
individual rights. After the nonjudicial branches of government
enact and enforce a law, thereby demonstrating their belief that the
law is constitutional or that constitutionality is not their concern,
the court must review the law to determine whether it does, in fact,
meet constitutional standards. By observing this cautious, often
burdensome and sometimes unpopular procedure, the courts can
often prevent the will of the majority from unfairly interfering with
the rights of individuals who, even when acting as a group, may be
unable to protect themselves through the political process. In this
way, judicial review assures a government under the laws. 8
Although Chief Justice Wright's opinion for a unanimous court in
People v. Olivas9 concerned an issue less controversial than those in many
other decisions rendered by the Wright court, 10 the constitutional analysis
adopted in Olivas could have a major impact on legislation regarding the
institutionalization and control of criminal offenders in California. This
Constitution and Robinson-Gustafson doctrine repudiated).
In both United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973), and Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S.
260 (1973), the United States Supreme Court held that the defendants' Fourth Amendment
rights had not been violated by searches incident to lawful custodial arrests. Under the
Robinson-Gustafson approach, individuals arrested for relatively minor offenses such as traffic
infractions could be subjected to a full body search even if they were entitled to post bond and
secure immediate release without stationhouse confinement. 414 U.S. at 266. Under the
Brisendine approach, however, such individuals could only be subjected to a pat-down search
for weapons, and then only if necessary to ensure the safety of the arresting officers. 13 Cal. 3d
at 547, 531 P.2d at 1111, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 327.
6. See, e.g., Carter v. United States, 306 F.2d 283 (D.C. Cir. 1962); Smith v. State, 444
S.W.2d 941 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969).
7. 6 Cal. 3d 628, 493 P.2d 880, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152 (1972).
8. Wright, The Role of the Judiciary: From Marbury to Anderson, 60 CALIF. L. REV.
1262, 1268 (1972) [hereinafter cited as The Judiciary].
9. 17 Cal. 3d 236, 551 P.2d 375, 131 Cal. Rptr. 55 (1976).
10. See notes 2-5 supra.
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commentary will focus on the equal protection analysis employed in the
Olivas opinion. After first reviewing the historical and factual background
of that decision, the impact and implications of the court's holding that
"personal liberty" is a fundamental interest for purposes of equal protection
analysis will then be discussed. The analysis concludes with the observation
that the future impact of the Olivas decision will ultimately depend upon the
extent to which members of the judiciary adhere to the judicial philosophy
of Chief Justice Wright as demonstrated in the spirit as well as the letter of
his opinion for the court.
I.

Factual Background

As part of a national movement to address the growing problem of
youthful criminal offenders, California enacted the Youth Authority Act'1 in
1941 and codified it in the Welfare and Institutions Code. 12 The purpose of the
Act was to provide youthful offenders of the criminal law, who had not yet
attained adult status, with an opportunity to receive specialized "treatment"
that might prevent them from following a life of crime. 3 The need for a
separate agency to handle such individuals had already been perceived by
many in the juvenile justice field who recognized that most local facilities
available to the county juvenile court system were unsuited for handling
these older and more sophisticated offenders. 14 Prior to the adoption of the
Act an older juvenile arrested for violation of a penal statute faced one of
two dispositional alternatives. He could be processed through the juvenile
court system with the possibility of committment to a local juvenile detention facility, or he could be certified to the superior court for processing
through the adult criminal courts with the possibility of prosecution and
eventual sentencing to either county jail or state prison. 15 The Youth Authority Act provided a third or middle-ground alternative: even if an older
juvenile between the ages of sixteen and twenty-one was certified to the
criminal courts and subsequently convicted, the sentencing court could
exercise its discretion 16 and commit the juvenile to the Youth Authority,
11. 1941 Cal. Stats., ch. 937, at 2522. The act was entitled the "Youth Authority Correction Act" until 1943 when "correction" was deleted, 1943 Cal. Stats., ch. 690, § 2, at 2442.
12. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 1700-1861 (West 1972).
13. "The purpose of this chapter is to protect society more effectively by substituting for
retributive punishment methods of training and treatment directed toward the correction and
rehabilitation of young persons found guilty of public offenses." CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE
§ 1700 (West 1972).
14. See generally Bennett, Indeterminate Control of Offenders: Realistic and Protective, 9
LAW & CoNTEMP. PROB. 616 (1943); Holton, Youth Correction Authority in Action: The
CaliforniaExperience, 9 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 655 (1943) [hereinafter cited as The California
Experience]; MacCormick, Existing Provisionsfor the Correctionof Youthful Offenders, 9 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROB. 588 (1943); Sellin, Youth and Crime, 9 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 581 (1943).
15. See 1915 Cal. Stats., ch. 631, §§ 4d, 6-8, at 1228-33 (repealed 1947).
16. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 1731.5 (West 1972).
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where he would, in theory if not in practice, receive rehabilitative treatment
rather than penal confinement. For this reason, the California Youth Authority system was viewed as a progressive innovation to meet the problem of
17
youthful criminal offenders.
In order to ensure that the Youth Authority would have sufficient time
to rehabilitate youthful offenders, the California legislature placed a provision in the Act that created the distinct possibility that juveniles convicted of
a crime in adult courts could be committed to the Youth Authority for far
longer periods of time than other juveniles or adults convicted of the
identical crime could be committed to county jail. This provision, section
1770 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, still provides that: "Every
person convicted of a misdemeanor and committed to the authority shall be
discharged upon the expiration of a two-year period of control or when the
person reaches his 23d birthday, whichever occurs later." 18 Whereas a
sixteen year-old juvenile, for example, could be committed following conviction of a misdemeanor to an institution of the Youth Authority and held for
"rehabilitative treatment" for a period of six years, the maximum penal
sentence that could be imposed on a similarly convicted adult or juvenile
was one year in county jail.' 9
The constitutionality of section 1770 was first tested by the California
Supreme Court in 1943. In an opinion by Justice Traynor, the court unanimously held in In re Herrera20 that the statutory scheme complied with the
equal protection provisions of both the United States and California Constitutions because it was reasonably related to the rehabilitative purposes of
the Youth Authority Act. 21 Six years after Herrerawas decided, the constitutionality of section 1770 was again challenged by a youthful misdemeanant who, notwithstanding the alleged rehabilitative purposes of the
Act, had been incarcerated in San Quentin Prison where no adult misdemeanant could be sentenced. In an opinion authored by Justice Raymond E.
Peters, who was later to gain prominence as the liberal conscience of the
California Supreme Court under Chief Justice Traynor, the District Court of
Appeal held in People v. Scherbing22 that neither the extended term of
confinement permitted by section 1770 nor the ward's incarceration in state
prison rendered the Youth Authority Act unconstitutional.2 3
17. Compare People v. Scherbing, 93 Cal. App. 3d 736,740-41,209 P.2d 796,798-99(1947)
with The California Experience, supra note 14, at 662.
18. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 1770 (West 1972).
19. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 19a (West 1977).
20. 23 Cal. 2d 206, 143 P.2d 345 (1943).
21. Id. at 213, 143 P.2d at 348.
22. 93 Cal. App. 2d 736, 209 P.2d 796 (1949).
23. Id. at 741-42, 209 P.2d at 799.
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Few, if any, challenges to the commitment provisions of the Youth
Authority Act were noted in the published opinions of the California appellate courts during the twenty-five year period following the Scherbing
decision. It was not until 1976 that evolving standards of constitutional
analysis led to the disapproval of the outrageous inequality permitted by
section 1770. In that year, the California Supreme Court was once again
approached by a youthful misdemeanant who challenged the constitutionality of section 1770. Jesus Olivas was nineteen years old when he was
arrested and charged with the criminal conduct that subsequently resulted in
his conviction for simple assault, an offense normally punishable under the
Penal Code by a maximum sentence of six months in county jail.2 4 Because
the sentencing court exercised its discretionary sentencing powers and
committed him to the Youth Authority,2 5 however, Olivas faced the possibility of four years in confinement, the maximum length of his commitment
being limited only by attainment of his twenty-third birthday. 26 To make
matters worse, by the time of sentencing, Olivas had already been confined
in the county jail for approximately ninety days. 27 Had he been sentenced to
the maximum jail term for adults not committed to the Youth Authority, the
back-time credit provisions of the Penal Code would have limited the period
of additional incarceration to ninety days. 28 Olivas contended that the disparate length of commitment permitted by section 1770 constituted a blatant
violation of his right to equal protection of the law. Fully aware that the
same statutory scheme had passed constitutional muster in Herrera and
proceeded to
Scherbing, the court granted Olivas' petition for a hearing and
29
Olivas.
v.
People
in
1770
reconsider the validity of section
Unlike the circumstances that existed at the time of the Herrera and
Scherbing decisions; youthful misdemeanants committed to the Youth Authority and held by it pursuant to section 1770 at the time Olivas was
committed fell within two distinctly identifiable sub-groups. These groups
were created when the California legislature reduced the age of majority
from twenty-one to eighteen years in 1971.30 The reduction in the age of
majority meant that certain adult misdemeanants, that is, those between the
24.
25.
§ 1731.5
26.

CAL. PENAL CODE § 241 (West 1970) (amended 1977).
17 Cal. 3d at 239, 551 P.2d at 376, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 56. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE
(West 1972).
See 17 Cal. 3d at 241, 551 P.2d at 378, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 58 (citing CAL. WELF. & INST.

CODE § 1770 (West 1972)).
27. 17 Cal. 3d at 242 n.9, 551 P.2d at 378 n.9, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 58 n.9.
28. 1971 Cal. Stats., ch. 1678, § 1, at 3604-05 (current version at CAL. PENAL CODE

§ 2900.5 (West Supp. 1977)).
29. 17 Cal. 3d 236, 551 P.2d 375, 131 Cal. Rptr. 55 (1976).

30. "Adults" are defined in California as individuals who have attained eighteen years of
age. CAL. CIV. CODE § 25.1 (West Supp. 1977).
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ages of eighteen and twenty-one, could be committed to the Youth Authority and held for longer terms of confinement than older adults who were
sentenced to county jail. Thus, in 1976, the individuals confined in institutions of the Youth Authority pursuant to section 1770 were both juveniles
between sixteen and eighteen years of age and adults between the ages of
eighteen and twenty-one. 3' It was in this somewhat different factual context
that the Wright Court considered Olivas' equal protection claim.
II.

Personal Liberty as a Fundamental Interest

In attacking the length of his possible term of confinement pursuant to
section 1770, Olivas faced two major obstacles. First, Justice Traynor's
holding in Herrerathat the statutory scheme did not violate equal protection
principles still stood as valid precedent. Second, the California Supreme
Court had more recently held that the Youth Authority Act was not susceptible to attack on cruel and unusal punishment grounds because it served a
rehabilitative rather than penal function. 32 On the other hand, at least two
factors appeared to weigh in Olivas' favor. First, the court had deliberately
exercised its discretion by granting Olivas' petition in order to reconsider an
issue that had been resolved over twenty years before. Second, in contrast
to the demonstrated reticence of the Burger Court to continue the expansion
of equal protection concepts begun by the Warren Court, the California
Supreme Court under the leadership of Chief Justice Wright continued to
enlarge the scope of protection under the equal protection clauses of the
California constitution. 33 Thus, while a majority of the Burger Court refused
to hold either that education was a fundamental interest 34 or that wealth 35
and sex were suspect classifications,36 the California Supreme Court reached the opposite conclusion in each instance based upon its independent
review of the issues and policy considerations involved. 37 As a consequence
of the active role pursued by the Wright court in defining new fundamental
interests and suspect classifications, there was a strong possibility that the
court would consider a new fundamental interest approach in Olivas.
31.- 17 Cal. 3d at 240 n.5, 551 P.2d at 377 n.5, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 57 n.5.
32. In re Gary W., 5 Cal. 3d 296, 301, 486 P.2d 1201, 1205, 96 Cal. Rptr. 1, 5 (1971)
(concluding that the Youth Authority Act was rehabilitative and not penal in nature).

33. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7(a,b); id. at art. IV, § 16.
34. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
35. Id.
36. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
37. See Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584,604-10,487 P.2d 1241, 1255-59,96 Cal. 601,615-19
(1971) (education is a fundamental interest); id. at 597-604, 487 P.2d at 1250-55, 96 Cal. Rptr. at
610-15 (wealth is a suspect classification); Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 485 P.2d 529,
95 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1971) (sex is a suspect classification).
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The proposition that personal liberty should be considered a fundamental interest for purposes of equal protection analysis may, at first impression,
seem unassailable. Nevertheless, prior to Olivas, no court of last resort in
the United States had made such a determination. Several lower federal
courts had addressed the issue with conflicting results. 3 8 That the status of
personal liberty as a fundamental interest was the subject of dispute when
the California Supreme Court considered Olivas' equal protection claim
may have been due, in part, to a lack of appellate challenges to statutory
schemes affecting liberty interests and, in part, to the ongoing development
of equal protection analysis. At the same time, the justifications set forth by
those courts that have rejected the concept of personal liberty as a
fundamental interest provide another explanation, namely, the belief that
legislative bodies should have unfettered discretion to specify the manner in
which criminal offenders should be handled following conviction. 39 The
assertive role taken by the California Supreme Court under Chief Justice
Wright's leadership demonstrated, however, that it recognized its constitutional responsibility to check legislative excesses when such action was
0
necessary.n
In assessing Olivas' equal protection claim, Chief Justice Wright began
by defining the limits of personal liberty. He rejected the suggestion that
personal liberty should merely include the individual's interest in freedom
from incarceration, noting that wards on parole from the Youth Authority
were still subject to a significant number of restraints on their freedom of
movement. 4t Taking a broader view than the state would have preferred,
Chief Justice Wright concluded instead that an individual's constitutional
interest in personal liberty must include freedom from all forms of control
by the Youth Authority.4 2
Having defined the limits of the constitutional interest that was affected
by section 1770, Chief Justice Wright turned to the most important aspect of
Olivas' equal protection claim, the question whether personal liberty
should be considered a fundamental interest for purposes of equal protection
analysis. Because the paucity of significant precedent on that subject pre38. Compare Boiling v. Manson, 345 F. Supp. 48 (D. Conn. 1972) and United States ex
rel. Robinson v. York, 281 F. Supp. 8 (D. Conn. 1968) (holding that personal liberty is a
fundamental interest) with Sero v. Oswald, 351 F. Supp. 522 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd in partand
remanded in part sub nom. United States ex rel. Sero v. Preiser, 506 F.2d 1115 (2d Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 921 (1975) (holding that personal liberty is not a fundamental interest).

39. See, e.g., Smith v. State, 444 S.W.2d 941 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969).
40. See, e.g., In re Foss, 10 Cal. 3d 910, 519 P.2d 1073, 112 Cal. Rptr. 649 (1974); In re
Lynch, 8 Cal.3d 410, 503 P.2d 921, 105 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1972); People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628,
493 P.2d 880, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152 (1972).
41. 17 Cal. 3d at 245, 551 P.2d at 380-81, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 60-61.
42. Id., 551 P.2d at 381, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 61.
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cluded reliance upon prior decisional law, the Chief Justice reviewed the
significance given to the concept of personal liberty throughout AngloAmerican legal history. 43 That review revealed elaborate due process
guarantees, developed to protect individuals against unjust deprivations of
such liberty. As a result, Chief Justice Wright concluded that personal
liberty is "a fundamental interest, second only to life itself, as an interest
protected under both the California and United States Constitutions.' 4
Upon concluding that personal liberty is a fundamental interest for
purposes of equal protection analysis, the court subjected section 1770 to the
test of strict scrutiny.45 Although the burden of proving a statute unconstitutional is customarily placed upon the party making such a claim, once the
court reached its fundamental interest determination, the burden then shifted
to the state to establish that it had a compelling interest justifying treatment
of youthful offenders in a manner different from adults over the age of
twenty-one, and that this distinction was necessary to further that interest. 46
The state was, however, unable to bear its burden of justifying section 1770.
Even when the court conceded for the sake of argument that the rehabilitation of youthful offenders was compelling, the state failed to show that
youthful misdemeanants necessarily required a longer term of confinement
or control for rehabilitative treatment than the maximum penal term that
could be imposed for the same offense.4 7 The court was also unpersuaded by
the state's suggestion that the longer term of control by the Youth Authority
could be justified because a ward who successfully completed his commitment was entitled to have his conviction expunged from the public record.
In response to that justification, Chief Justice Wright noted that individuals
who succesifully completed probation from a criminal court were similarly
43. Id. at 248-51, 551 P.2d at 382-84, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 62-64.
44. Id. at 251, 551 P.2d at 384, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 64.

45. The two-tiered approach to equal protection claims involves the application of two
considerably different standards of judicial scrutiny depending upon the court's perspective of

the interests affected by the challenged legislation. If the statutory scheme is seen as simply
regulating economic relationships, the court will exercise restraint. Under such a view, the
legislation bears a presumption of constitutionality and needs only some rational relationship to
a conceivable legitimate state purpose in order to be upheld. If, however, the court determines

that the legislation affects "fundamental interests" or involves "suspect classifications," it will
be strictly scrutinized; the state must affirmatively carry the burden of demonstrating that it has
a compelling interest that will justify the law and that the classifications created by the law are
necessary to further that interest. 17 Cal. 3d at 243-44, 551 P.2d at 379, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 59. The
vast difference between these two standards of review means, of necessity, that the court's
final conclusion as to the constitutionality of a statute will quite often be determined by the

standard of review that the court chooses to apply in any given case. As a consequence, the
court's conclusion as to what interests are to be deemed "fundamental" and what classifica-

tions are to be deemed "suspect" is of critical importance.
46. Id., 551 P.2d at 385, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 65.
47. Id. at 255, 551 P.2d at 387, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 67.
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entitled to expungement but were not required to undergo longer periods of
confinement in exchange for that benefit.4 8 Having thus addressed the
state's arguments, the court unanimously concluded that no sound rationale
existed that could justify the unequal deprivations of personal liberty made
possible by the statutory scheme and, therefore, held that section 1770 was
constitutionally invalid. 49
III.

Impact and Implications

In spite of the fact that the statutory scheme declared invalid in Olivas
permitted, and, in fact, resulted in the imposition of significantly longer and
thus manifestly unjust terms of commitment, some may claim that the court
overstepped the proper bounds of judicial restraint. There are those, even
among the judiciary, who hold to the belief that a court acts improperly
when it subjects legislative enactments or executive actions to strict
scrutiny, particularly when the matter in question involves the length of time
50
that criminal offenders can be controlled by the state following conviction.
At least one author has already suggested that the court's decision to treat
personal liberty as a fundamental interest planted the seed for the eventual
destruction of the juvenile justice system, because the state will never be
able to demonstrate a compelling interest that would justify any differential
treatment of juveniles and adults. 51 In the same vein, it might also be argued
that the court's fundamental interest approach to personal liberty will subject
all penal statutes to strict scrutiny and thereby result in an intolerable
limitation on legislative prerogatives in that field. Such claims and fears are,
however, groundless; those who espouse such arguments overlook one
crucial element in the court's equal protection analysis: the first prerequisite
to a meritorious claim of unconstitutionality is a showing that the state has
adopted a classification that affects two or more similarly situated groups in
52
an unequal manner.
48. Id. at 256, 551 P.2d at 388, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 68.
49. Id. at 257, 551 P.2d at 389, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 69.
50. See, e.g., Sero v. Oswald, 351 F. Supp. 522 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd in part and

remanded in part sub nom. United States ex rel. Sero v. Preiser, 506 F.2d 1115 (2d Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 921 (1975); Smith v. State, 444 S.W.2d 941 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969).

51. Note, Extended Incarcerationof Youth Offenders, 65 CALIF. L. REV. 345, 353 (1977).
52. See, e.g., In re Roger S., 19 Cal. 3d 655, 668, 566 P.2d 997,1005,139 Cal. Rptr. 861, 869
(1977); People v. Olivas, 17 Cal. 3d 236, 240-43, 551 P.2d 375, 377-79, 131 Cal. Rptr. 55, 57-59
(1976); Westbrook v. Mihaly, 2 Cal. 3d 765, 782-83,471 P.2d 487,498-99, 87 Cal. Rptr. 839, 85051 (1970), vacated on othergrounds, 403 U.S. 915 (1971). See also CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH
SERVICE, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION 1471-72 (L. Jayson ed. 1973). As Justice Frankfurter once

wrote, "The Constitution does not require things which are different in fact to be treated in law
as though they were the same." Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141, 147 (1940).
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In the context of the juvenile justice system, the detractors must bear in
mind the significant differences between juvenile status and adulthood. By
definition, the most conspicuous disparity between a juvenile and an adult is
the greater liberty interest and freedom of action possessed by the adult upon
attainment of majority. Although juveniles possess important personal liberty interests, those interests are limited by the qualified right of a parent to
direct the actions of his or her child 54 and by the state's "somewhat broader
authority to regulate the activities of children than of adults." 55 Thus, when
the state steps into the shoes of the parents through the vehicle of the
juvenile justice system, it assumes the authority to limit the juvenile's
freedom of action. By contrast, there are few, if any, circumstances in
which the in loco parentis rationale can be used to justify state impingement
on an adult's personal liberty interest.
In fact, while sitting by assignment after retirement from the court,
Chief Justice Wright recently authored an opinion in which he made this
very distinction between adults and juveniles. In In re Roger S.,56 the
California Supreme Court considered the issue of a juvenile's right to
challenge his parents' decision to "voluntarily" commit him to a state
hospital for treatment of a mental disorder. Although the court concluded
that the fourteen year old juvenile was entitled to certain procedures designed to protect his due process interests,5 7 the court rejected the companion
equal protection claim that the minor was entitled to receive the same
procedural guarantees afforded other individuals who were involuntarily
committed for evaluation and treatment pursuant to a statutory scheme that
did not encompass "voluntary" parental commitments. 5" Significantly,
Chief Justice Wright justified the court's refusal to accept the equal protection claim on the ground that juveniles in the circumstances of Roger S.
were not "similarly situated" with adults and wards of the juvenile court
who had already been granted the statutory due process guarantees. 59 In
reaching this conclusion, Chief Justice Wright relied on the qualitative
difference between the personal liberty interests of a juvenile and an adult,
as well as the "compelling" right of the parent to direct his or her child's
60
upbringing.
The court's decision in Roger S., and in particular Chief Justice
Wright's reliance on the basic requirement that a challenged statute be
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

19 Cal. 3d at 661-62, 566 P.2d at 1000-01, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 864-65.
Id. at 668, 566 P.2d at 1001-02, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 865-66.
Planned Parenthood of Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976).
19 Cal. 3d 655, 566 P.2d 997, 139 Cal.Rptr. 861 (1977).
Id. at 671, 566 P.2d at 1006-07, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 870-71.
Id. at 666-68, 566 P.2d at 1004-05, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 868-69.
Id. at 668-69, 566 P.2d at 1005, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 869.
Id. at 668, 566 P.2d at 1005, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 869.
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shown to affect two similarly situated groups in an unequal manner, clearly
demonstrates that the court's earlier holding in Olivas that personal liberty is
a fundamental interest will not necessarily result in the wholesale invalidation of California's juvenile or criminal justice systems. At the same time,
Roger S. illustrates the shift in emphasis that can be expected to take place
in future cases involving assertions that unequal deprivations of personal
liberty have resulted from the operation of a challenged statute. Instead of
focusing on the issue of personal liberty as a fundamental interest, the
outcome of future personal liberty cases will most probably be determined
by the ability of the individual or group raising the equal protection claim to
demonstrate that they are similarly situated with another group that receives
different treatment as a consequence of the challenged statute.
In view of this shift in focus, it will be the responsibility of the
California judiciary carefully to evaluate claims of similar situation. In
Olivas, Chief Justice Wright and the court faced just such a task. The court
could conceivably have chosen to analyze the statutory scheme by differentiating between the two groups of individuals most directly affected by
section 1770, namely, juveniles and adult misdemeanants, all of whom
could be held under the control of the Youth Authority pursuant to section
1770. It would have been a relatively simple matter for the court to have
limited its personal liberty holding to adults like Olivas who were confined
in the Youth Authority for longer periods of time than other adult misdemeanants who could not be committed because they had attained twenty-one
years of age prior to arrest. Instead, when defining the group of individuals
to be compared with these older adults, Chief Justice Wright included the
juveniles who were also controlled by the Youth Authority pursuant to
section 1770. Having made the decision to proceed against such juveniles in
the criminal courts rather than through the juvenile court system, the state,
observed the Chief Justice, had decided that the juveniles were similarly
situated with those adults also convicted of misdemeanor offenses. 6 1 Accordingly, juvenile misdemeanant Youth Authority wards were included in
the court's constitutional evaluation. In essence, Chief Justice Wright and
the court looked beyond the label of "juvenile" and concluded instead that
the actual class of persons similarly situated for purposes of the equal
protection challenge consisted of all misdemeanants, whether juvenile or
adult, who had been prosecuted and convicted as "adults in adult courts.'62
The realistic approach taken by Chief Justice Wright in defining the
class of similarly situated persons in Olivas exemplifies the type of analysis
that should be employed if personal liberty as a fundamental interest is to
61. 17 Cal. 3d at 242-43, 551 P.2d at 379, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 59.
62. Id.
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have any lasting impact and meaning. It is hoped that when faced with
similar issues, the California courts will adhere to the spirit as well as the
letter of Chief Justice Wright's opinion in Olivas.
Conclusion
Under the leadership of Chief Justice Donald R. Wright, the California
Supreme Court confronted the pressing questions of the day. In choosing to
follow its own course, the Wright court rendered decisions involving complex and controversial issues, often drawing itself into conflict with other
branches of government and, in some instances, with the expressed will of
the majority. At all times, however, the court was guided in its actions by
Chief Justice Wright's philosophy that the judiciary must act when necessary to curb legislative and executive excesses that have resulted in the
deprivation of those values that form the basis for our legal system of
government. As the Chief Justice observed on a prior occasion,
A democratic government must do more than serve the immediate needs of a majority of its constituency-it must respect the
"enduring general values" of the society. Somehow, a democracy
must tenaciously cling to its long-term concepts of justice regardless of the vacillating feelings experienced by a majority of the
electorate.
In my opinion, in our system only the judiciary can guarantee
that "general values" will endure and that the rights of all, including those of politically impotent minorities, will be protected as the
Constitution requires. 63
Through his words and deeds, Chief Justice Donald R. Wright has thus left a
rich legacy not only for future members of the California Supreme Court but
for all who would don judicial robes.
63.

The Judiciary, supra note 8, at 1267 (footnote omitted).

